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PUBLIC DISCOURSE, EXPERT KNOWLEDGE, AND THE
PRESS
Joseph Blocher*
Abstract: This Essay identifies and elaborates two complications raised by Robert Post’s
Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom, and in doing so attempts to show how Post’s
theory can account for constitutional protection of the press. The first complication is a
potential circularity arising from the relationships between the concepts of democratic
legitimation, public discourse, and protected social practices. Democratic legitimation
predicates First Amendment coverage on participation in public discourse, whose boundaries
are defined as those social practices necessary for the formation of public opinion. But close
examination of the relationships between these three concepts raises the question of whether
public discourse and social practices can do any analytic work independent of the value of
democratic legitimation, or instead are simply labels for speech that furthers it. Consideration
of the press helps to illuminate the problem and a potential solution.
The second complication is the interface between expert knowledge and public discourse.
Post’s theory of democratic competence convincingly explains how such knowledge is
created and circulated outside of public discourse. But in order to inform self-governance,
expert knowledge must ultimately be disseminated into public discourse. The theory does not
yet account for how this happens, nor how such expert knowledge can serve an informative
function, given that public discourse transmutes claims of expert knowledge into statements
of opinion. Again, the press serves as an illustrative and important example.

INTRODUCTION
Robert Post’s Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom1
explains our constitutional commitment to free speech in light of two
central and sometimes conflicting principles: democratic legitimation
and democratic competence. In doing so, the book employs concepts that
Post has carefully crafted over the past few decades, including the
constitutional concept of public discourse,2 the lexical priority of

* Assistant Professor, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Stuart Benjamin, Michael Gerhardt, Marin
K. Levy, Robert Post, and Neil Siegel for valuable suggestions. The author retains the copyright in
this article and authorizes royalty-free reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided any such
reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington Law Review.
1. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012).
2. See generally Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601
(1990) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse].
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participatory democracy as a First Amendment principle,3 and the need
to orient First Amendment doctrine around social practices rather than
“speech as such.”4 Drawing heavily on that earlier work, this Essay
attempts to identify and explore two ways in which those concepts are
particularly hard to reconcile. First, it is difficult to maintain a
conceptual thread through public discourse, protected social practices,
and democratic legitimation while treating each of them as independent
and important parts of First Amendment analysis. Second, Post’s theory
raises intractable questions about how expert knowledge is disseminated
into public discourse and how it should be treated once it arrives there.
In the course of exploring those difficulties, this Essay also considers
how Post’s theory can account for First Amendment protection of the
press.
Following the structure of the book, this Essay proceeds in two parts.
Part I explores the relationships between public discourse, protected
social practices, and democratic legitimation. Specifically, it asks
whether the first two concepts define the boundaries of the third, or the
other way around—whether, in other words, public discourse and
protected social practices establish the boundaries of speech that furthers
the principle of democratic legitimation, or whether they are simply
labels for speech that does so. Part I begins, as Post does, with the
proposition that the First Amendment must be interpreted in line with its
core values.5 The primary value of First Amendment doctrine is
democratic legitimation6—allowing speakers to communicate in public
discourse7 and thereby experience themselves as participating in the

3. See generally Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477
(2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory Democracy]; Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a
Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Reply].
4. See generally Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1250 (1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating]. Throughout this Essay, I will use “social practices” as
shorthand for this focus on context rather than substance. Post also uses terms like “forms of
conduct,” “social roles,” and “communicative processes.” See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying
text.
5. POST, supra note 1, at 4 (“The actual contours of First Amendment doctrine cannot be
explained merely by facts in the world; they must instead reflect the law’s efforts to achieve
constitutional values.”); Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 477 (“I begin with the
premise that interpreting the First Amendment involves explicating our national dedication to
freedom of expression.”).
6. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 482 (“In my view, the best possible
explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is the value of democratic self-governance.”).
7. Id. (“The value of democratic legitimation occurs . . . specifically through processes of
communication in the public sphere.”).
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shared project of self-government.8
Defining the boundaries of public discourse is therefore an essential,
difficult, and inherently normative goal.9 In pursuit of that goal, Post
argues that public discourse is not defined by the content of specific
speech acts, but by “the forms of communication constitutionally
deemed necessary for formation of public opinion.”10 As in his previous
work, Post focuses on these forms of communication, looking to
“particular social practices”11 rather than “speech as such.”12 He is
thereby able to construct a rich First Amendment theory that is grounded
in current doctrine, accounts for the social nature of speech, and leaves
necessary room for argumentation and change.13
But as Part I of this Essay attempts to show, Post’s approach also
raises conceptual difficulties. If particular social practices are
constitutionally protected because they constitute public discourse, and
public discourse is defined by those practices and protected because it
furthers them, then the two concepts appear circular and disconnected
from the value of democratic legitimation, which is what justifies their
protection in the first place.14 On the other hand, if the value of
democratic legitimation is doing all the work, then public discourse and
protected social practices are simply labels for protected speech, not
8. Id. at 483 (“The function of public discourse is to enable persons to experience the value of
self-government.”).
9. Id. at 488 (“Because the boundaries of public discourse are inherently normative, value
judgments must be made about the forms of speech that are and are not necessary for the
maintenance of democracy.”); Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 671 (“To classify speech as
public discourse is, in effect, to deem it relevant to this collective process of self-definition and
decisionmaking. There is obviously no theoretically neutral way in which this can be done.”).
10. POST, supra note 1, at 15 (citing, inter alia, Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831
(1995)).
11. See Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1250 (“The Court has imagined that the purpose of
First Amendment jurisprudence is to protect speech as such. But in fact the constitutional values
advanced to justify this protection inhere not in speech as such, but rather in particular social
practices.”).
12. Id.; see also Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 477–78 (“[T]he First
Amendment does not and should not protect ‘speech as such,’ as Justice Souter once put it.” (citing
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
13. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 618 (“[T]he task of explicating our own moral commitments
inevitably leaves ample room for critical intelligence.”). I take Tim Scanlon to be addressing a
similar point when he writes that “[t]he dialectical interplay between the guiding interests of a right
and strategies for protecting these interests is what allows rights to grow and change.” See T.M.
Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. REV. 541, 542 (2011).
14. As explained in more detail below in Part I.A, even assuming that I have read Post correctly,
this criticism would not necessarily mean that the concept of democratic legitimation is based on a
circularity, nor that it is empty, only that problems seem to arise when the concepts of public
discourse and social practices are used to define one another.
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substantive parts of the analysis.
This Essay considers a third understanding: that social practices,
which together constitute public discourse, are proxies for identifying
speech whose content presumptively furthers the principle of democratic
legitimation. This differs from Post’s approach inasmuch as it treats
public discourse and social practices as having evidentiary, rather than
intrinsic, value. Under the proxy approach, determining whether a
particular social practice forms part of the “structural skeleton that is
necessary, although not sufficient, for public discourse to serve the
constitutional value of democracy”15 requires a continuous assessment of
whether the speech occurring within it tends to be “normatively
necessary for influencing public opinion.”16
The press provides a particularly useful lens through which to
examine these relationships between public discourse, social practices,
and democratic legitimation. Post writes that “[m]edia speech
is . . . unique because it carries within it [a] prima facie claim to
constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely on the manner of its
distribution rather than on its content.”17 But despite this unique claim,
First Amendment doctrine has never extended protection to the press
qua press. Why not? Moreover, many forms of “media speech” are in
fact denied full First Amendment protection—copyrighted speech and
commercial advertising, for example. Why? These questions and other
important issues, like the changing membership and mechanisms of the
press, raise serious complications with treating the press as a part of
public discourse.
While Part I of this Essay focuses on public discourse and the value
of democratic legitimation, Part II focuses on the second major First
Amendment value Post identifies: democratic competence. As he points
out, effective democracy depends on more than just the ability to
participate—it requires expert knowledge.18 But “[t]he continuous
discipline of peer judgment, which virtually defines expert knowledge, is
quite incompatible with deep and fundamental First Amendment

15. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1276.
16. POST, supra note 1, at 18.
17. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678. As Post puts it in the book, “First Amendment
coverage presumptively extends to media for the communication of ideas, like newspapers,
magazines, the Internet, or cinema, which are the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts
that define and sustain the public sphere.” POST, supra note 1, at 20. It follows that, “[i]n the
absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such media is covered by the First
Amendment.” Id.
18. See, e.g., POST, supra note 1, at 32, 35.
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doctrines,” such as those governing viewpoint and content neutrality.19
As Post puts it, “[d]emocratic competence is thus both incompatible with
democratic legitimation and required by it.”20 The bulk of his book is
devoted to reconciling the two, or at least sketching the terms of a
détente.
Part II explores two particularly difficult questions of democratic
competence: how expert knowledge enters into public discourse, and
how public discourse can accommodate it once it arrives there. Post
devotes considerable attention to the creation and circulation of expert
knowledge outside of public discourse. But in order to inform public
discourse—which Post considers an essential function of democratic
competence21—such knowledge must at some point enter into it. How
does that dissemination happen? Does it, like the creation of expert
knowledge, require disciplinarity?22 Moreover, as Post notes, “[w]ithin
public discourse, traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically
transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”23
How, then, does expert knowledge in public discourse add any value
above and beyond other claims of opinion?
In assessing democratic competence, Post focuses predominately on
the role of universities in creating and disseminating expert knowledge.24
The press, too, engages in information-producing activities that are
essential to its role but not a part of public discourse—newsgathering,
for example—and sometimes creates expert knowledge through
investigative journalism and the like. Perhaps, then, the press is also
entitled to constitutional protection under the principle of democratic
competence. This conclusion raises its own complications, some of
which overlap with those Post raises with regard to universities. Does
the press have its own disciplinary standards? Are they worthy of
respect? How can one define the boundaries of the press, and how do
those changing boundaries impact its disciplinarity?
19. Id. at 9; see also id. at 31 (“The creation of reliable disciplinary knowledge must accordingly
be relegated to institutions that are not controlled by the constitutional value of democratic
legitimation.”).
20. Id. at 34.
21. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
22. By disciplinarity, I mean the same thing as Post does—the observation of a discipline’s own
internal norms for veracity. See Robert Post, Debating Disciplinarity, 35 CRITICAL INQUIRY 749,
751 (2009) (“When we speak of a discipline, therefore, we speak not merely of a body of
knowledge but also of a set of practices by which that knowledge is acquired, confirmed,
implemented, preserved, and reproduced.”).
23. POST, supra note 1, at 44.
24. See id. at 61–95.
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It is beyond this Essay’s scope, and its author’s ability, to answer all
of these questions. The more limited goal here is to explore possible
tensions among some of the major themes animating Post’s book and his
other trailblazing First Amendment scholarship. These include the
complicated relationships between public discourse, protected social
practices, and democratic legitimation, and the difficulty of
accommodating expert knowledge within public discourse. In evaluating
these themes, this Essay also tries to apply Post’s theory to what is
perhaps the most constitutionally prominent speech practice of all:
journalism.25
I.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND THE PRESS

The relationship between public discourse and the social practices
comprising it is central to the notion of democratic legitimation, which is
the primary principle in Post’s First Amendment theory.26 And yet the
normative account of their constitutional value appears somewhat
circular: particular social practices are protected to the extent that they
constitute public discourse, while public discourse is protected to the
extent that it consists of those social practices. The animating value
underlying each is democratic legitimation, but the process of
identifying when they are at work seems to lead to circular (or perhaps
“public spherical”) results. This Part describes that complication, and
asks whether close consideration of the press as a First Amendment
institution can help resolve it.
A.

Public Discourse, Social Practices, and Democratic Legitimation

Post’s work begins with the premise that it is only possible to
understand First Amendment doctrine in light of the values and
principles the Amendment seeks to effectuate.27 Identifying those values,
of course, is perhaps the central quest in free speech scholarship.28
25. See infra Parts I.B and II.B (analyzing constitutional coverage of press activities in light of
the principles of democratic legitimation and democratic competence). For the purposes of this
Essay, I treat the press and journalism as more or less interchangeable concepts. I realize that this is
a contested proposition. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for
the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012) (arguing
that the Press Clause was understood as giving protection not just to journalists, but more broadly to
everyone using the technology of the press).
26. POST, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]he value of democratic legitimation trumps that of democratic
competence.”).
27. See sources cited supra note 5.
28. The Virginia Law Review recently collected a series of essays by preeminent First
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Individual autonomy and the marketplace of ideas are often treated as
the leading candidates, but Post’s book begins by showing that they are
flawed at best.29 He argues instead that the primary—although not
perfect or sole30—value behind the First Amendment is “democratic
legitimation,” the notion that “First Amendment coverage should extend
to all efforts deemed normatively necessary for influencing public
opinion.”31
The animating value of democratic legitimation, Post says, is “the
hope that persons who are permitted the opportunity to make public
opinion responsive to their own subjective, personal views might come
to regard themselves as the potential authors of the laws that bind
them.”32 Thus “those who are subject to law should also experience
themselves as the authors of law,” and should have “the possibility of
influencing public opinion.”33 In order to achieve this, the First
Amendment “requires . . . that public opinion remain continuously open
to revision.”34
This view of the First Amendment draws strength from theories based
on individual autonomy (what Post calls the “ethical” view), the
marketplace of ideas (“cognitive”), and democratic functioning
Amendment scholars addressing Post’s arguments and presenting others. See James Weinstein,
Introduction, 97 VA. L. REV. iii (2011) (introducing symposium).
29. POST, supra note 1, at 6–13.
30. Post has argued for more than a decade in favor of a lexical priority of First Amendment
theories. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2371 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Theory and Doctrine] (“[W]here the doctrinal
implications of different prominent theories of the First Amendment collide, courts will tend to give
priority to the participatory theory of democracy. But this does not mean that other theories do not
continue to have weight and consequence when they are not inconsistent with the participatory
theory.”); see also Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 617 (noting that “a certain degree of pragmatic
simplification” is an “inevitable consequence” of describing constitutional principles that can be
easily explained and feasibly implemented); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the
Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 679 (2011) (“[P]articipatory
democracy is the worst theory of free speech, except for all the others.”).
31. POST, supra note 1, at 18.
32. Id. at 27–28.
33. Id. at 17. As Post notes, giving citizens access to the public sphere and requiring
governmental decision making to be rendered accountable to public opinion are “necessary for
democratic legitimation; they are not sufficient.” Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at
482 & n.17; see also POST, supra note 1, at 21; Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation,
and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (2011) (“[I]t is worth noting that
political participation and the public sphere are not co-extensive.”). Post has elsewhere called this
the argument from participatory democracy. See Post, Theory and Doctrine, supra note 30, at 2367–
68 (describing “participatory” theory of democracy as “locat[ing] self-governance . . . in the
processes through which citizens come to identify a government as their own”).
34. POST, supra note 1, at 20.
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(“political”),35 but does not depend on any one of them. Crucially, it is
deeply grounded in current doctrine.36 It explains, for example, why First
Amendment doctrine purportedly denies that there is such a thing as a
“false idea” in public discourse,37 protects public employees speaking on
matters of public concern (and less so when they are not),38 and erects
high barriers to defamation claims when the plaintiff is a public figure.39
Exploring these examples and others, Post presents democratic
legitimation as “the most convincing account of the normative
foundations of our First Amendment.”40
Post has defended this account of the First Amendment’s underlying
values elsewhere and at some length.41 The purpose of this Essay is not
to revisit the question of whether democratic legitimation is the primary
value of the First Amendment, but to explore the ways in which that
value is or can be effectuated in doctrine. For even if one accepts
democratic legitimation as the First Amendment’s central value, there
remains the difficult question of determining how courts can recognize it
at work.42 That is, in order to resolve actual cases, those who embrace
the theory must be able to show whether particular speech acts implicate
the value of democratic legitimation.
Post’s primary solution is to say that the value of democratic
legitimation is implicated when speech occurs within “public discourse.”
Though this is not a necessary condition for First Amendment
protection43—the value of democratic competence, after all, extends to
speech that is not. Post argues that the line between speech inside and
35. See id. at 6.
36. Post rightly regards this as an important quality of his or any other First Amendment theory.
See id. at 4–5 (suggesting that “we can learn the purposes we have constructed First Amendment
doctrine to achieve by tracing the contours of actual First Amendment coverage”); see also Post,
Reply, supra note 3, at 617–18.
37. See POST, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1979)).
38. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (concluding that First Amendment
coverage is triggered “in certain circumstances” when a government employee “speak[s] as a citizen
addressing matters of public concern”).
39. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public officials
to demonstrate “actual malice” in order to prevail in defamation cases).
40. POST, supra note 1, at xii.
41. See, e.g., Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3; Post, Reply, supra note 3.
42. Elsewhere, Post has explained that regulations can fall within the scope of the First
Amendment either because of “what content” they limit or “why” they do so. Post, Participatory
Democracy, supra note 3, at 478 n.4 (“These logically distinct inquiries refer roughly to the object
and purpose of a government regulation.”). My focus here is on the former.
43. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 667 n.323 (“I do not mean to imply, of course, that
the First Amendment protects only public discourse.”).
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outside of public discourse is “the single most salient pattern of
entrenched First Amendment doctrine.”44 Within public discourse, First
Amendment doctrine generally avoids judgments about the truth of
speech and truth generally,45 respects the speakers’ autonomy interests,46
and treats all speakers as having equal value.47 Outside of public
discourse, none of these things is true.
But focusing on the boundaries of public discourse, rather than
abstractly on the boundaries of democratic legitimation, simply reframes
the definitional question: What constitutes public discourse? This is an
extremely difficult48 and inherently normative49 question, whose answer
is continually changing.50 Moreover, “[w]hether through its political or
its judicial branches, governmental definition of the scope of public
discourse is itself a regulation of public discourse . . . .”51 Post
nonetheless concludes that although we do not “have a very clear or
hard-edged account” of the boundaries of public discourse, “it is
anthropologically apparent that they do exist and are reflected in
constitutional doctrine.”52
This Essay holds aside the institutional objections, which do not seem
unique to Post’s theory, and focuses on a conceptual complication that
might be: the degree to which the concepts of public discourse and social
practices can do any work (in terms of driving the analysis) independent
of the value of democratic legitimation. If the boundaries of First
Amendment coverage depend on the mutually defining concepts of
44. POST, supra note 1, at 23.
45. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment recognizes
no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974))). As
Post notes, however, the Court has also said that “there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see also POST, supra note 1, at 29–31, 43–47 (suggesting that the
distinction can be explained based on whether the purportedly false statements are part of public
discourse).
46. See POST, supra note 1, at 24.
47. Id. at xiii.
48. C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. REV.
515, 516 (2011) (noting “the serious difficulty of identifying when the person is engaged in
protected public discourse”).
49. POST, supra note 1, at 15; see also Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 683 (noting “the
startling proposition that the boundaries of public discourse cannot be fixed in a neutral fashion”).
50. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 683 (“In the end . . . there can be no final account of
the boundaries of the domain of public discourse.”).
51. Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes:
The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1303, 1343 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 683–84
(anticipating this objection).
52. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 622–23.
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public discourse and protected social practices, then those boundaries are
disconnected from the underlying constitutional value of democratic
legitimation. This is the problem Post’s theory seems to face. If instead
the boundaries are based directly on whether particular speech acts
further the value of democratic legitimation, the concepts of public
discourse and protected social practices seem to be little more than
conclusory labels.53 This is the problem manifested in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s “public concern” jurisprudence.54 The difficulty, then, is finding
a way to effectuate the value of democratic legitimation without either
ignoring or inflating the importance of public discourse and social
practices, or separating them from the underlying importance of
democratic legitimation itself. It may be helpful first to consider the
possible flaws in the two alternatives just described.
Post suggests that “[t]he contours of First Amendment
coverage . . . be determined in the first instance by a normative inquiry
into the forms of conduct we deem necessary for the free formation of
public opinion.”55 It follows that “[p]ublic discourse includes all
communicative processes deemed necessary for the formation of public
opinion.”56 This is an approach grounded very heavily in the context of
speech, rather than its content.57 It focuses on “communicative
processes,”58 “forms of conduct,”59 “forms of social order,”60 “social
practices,”61 and “social roles”62 rather than the content of speech itself.
53. Along similar lines, Eugene Volokh suggests that public discourse might simply be “a
conclusory label for that speech which is most protected.” Eugene Volokh, The Trouble With
“Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 573 (2011)
[hereinafter Volokh, “Public Discourse”]. Post believes that this criticism overstates the case. Post,
Reply, supra note 3, at 622.
54. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
55. POST, supra note 1, at 15.
56. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486. Post has noted elsewhere that “the very
concept of a medium for the communication of ideas can be defined only by reference to the
particular problems of public discourse.” Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1259.
57. Baker, supra note 48, at 517 (noting that under Post’s theory, “content should not be relevant”
(citing Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486)).
58. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486.
59. POST, supra note 1, at 15.
60. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1276–77 (“Instead of aspiring to articulate abstract
characteristics of speech, doctrine ought to identify discrete forms of social order that are imbued
with constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the ways in which speech facilitates
that constitutional value.”).
61. Id. at 1278–79 (“Off on a quixotic search for the meaning of such concepts as ‘listeners’
reactions,’ the Court has once again failed to examine the particular social practices that actually
give constitutional significance to its decisions.” (citation omitted)).
62. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 622.
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In sum, First Amendment values “do not attach to abstract acts of
communication as such, but rather to the social contexts that envelop and
give constitutional significance to acts of communication.”63
The emphasis on context—what this Essay has called social
practices—is prominent throughout Post’s work, and separates him even
from other scholars who believe that participatory democracy is the
primary value of the First Amendment. James Weinstein, for example,
agrees with Post about the central values of the First Amendment,64 but
defines public discourse as consisting of “speech on matters of public
concern, or, largely without respect to its subject matter, of expression in
settings dedicated or essential to democratic self-governance.”65 Post
appears to omit, or at least de-emphasize, the content variable.66 And as
he points out, hints of such a context-based approach can be found in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that First Amendment coverage
extends to practices that form a “significant medium for the
communication of ideas,”67 even if the specific communication at issue
does not successfully convey a particularized message.68
Defining public discourse—and therefore the boundaries of
democratic legitimation—based on context avoids some of the problems
of the content-based approach, but raises problems of its own. One root
complication is determining which contexts should be considered
constitutive of public discourse and why. One possible answer is that
public discourse consists of protected social practices such as print
media. But that only begs the question of why those media (i.e.,
contexts) are protected while others are not, particularly because media
of communication are so often changing. And it is unsatisfactory to say
that they are protected because they constitute public discourse. That
would be fully circular—the equivalent of saying that public discourse is
protected because it consists of certain valuable social practices, and that
those social practices are valuable because they constitute public
discourse. Post occasionally seems to drift in that direction. For
63. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1255; see also Post, Participatory Democracy, supra
note 3, at 477–78 (“[T]he First Amendment does not and should not protect ‘speech as such,’ as
Justice Souter once put it.” (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
64. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2011) (“[T]he value that best explains the pattern of free
speech decisions is a commitment to democratic self-governance.”).
65. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
66. See Baker, supra note 48, at 517 (noting the “added content criterion” in Weinstein’s theory).
67. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
68. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
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example, he has argued that “[s]peech is typically categorized as within
or as outside of public discourse according to whether it occurs within
social relationships that are regarded as requiring autonomy or
interdependence.”69 As Edwin Baker recognized, this “creates some
danger of circularity,” because “one suspects that Post would say that the
relevant ‘political’ conception of autonomy makes whether a person is
‘[w]ithin public discourse’ determinative of whether she should ‘be
regarded as autonomous.’”70
To be (relatively) clear, this circularity arises from the relationship
between the concepts of public discourse and social practices, not
necessarily from the concept of democratic legitimation itself. Indeed,
one way to avoid the circularity is to focus directly on the value of
democratic legitimation, extending constitutional protection to speech
acts whose content is “normatively necessary for influencing public
opinion.”71 Public discourse and protected social practices would then be
defined as those contexts in which such speech is found. This may be
consistent with current First Amendment doctrine. Indeed, Post has
noted that “[c]ontemporary doctrine delineates the domain of public
discourse primarily through an assessment of the content of speech.”72
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[s]peech deals with matters of
public concern,” and is therefore entitled to more “rigorous” protection
than “matters of purely private significance,”73 when it can be “fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”74
The context, setting, and medium of the speech act seem relevant to this
analysis75 only insofar as they suggest something about the content of
the speech.
69. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 483.
70. Baker, supra note 48, at 516; Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 484.
71. POST, supra note 1, at 18.
72. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 667. This assessment is now more than twenty years
old, but recent cases like Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), reinforce the fact
that content—along with “form” and “context”—remains a touchstone of the Court’s analysis. Id. at
1215.
73. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215–16; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). By contrast, the Court has said that
the First Amendment denies protection to speech on matters of “purely private concern.” Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (plurality opinion).
74. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (concluding that the inquiry of “whether . . . speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by . . . content, form, and context . . . as
revealed by the whole record” (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48)).
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Post rejects this content-based approach, concluding that in practice it
has proven “ultimately inadequate and self-contradictory.”76 It is also
hard to see how such an approach would give any weight to public
discourse and protected social practices. If speech’s content determines
whether it is entitled to First Amendment protection, public discourse
and protected social practices are simply conclusory labels, and do no
actual work. That is, if a speech act has been determined normatively
necessary for influencing public opinion, it is already, by definition,
entitled to constitutional protection under the principle of democratic
legitimation. Calling it public discourse would simply be an additional
label, one that reflects the relevant analysis but does not influence it.
There is, however, a third way to conceptualize the relationships
between public discourse, social practices, and democratic
legitimation—one that gives weight to both content and context. In this
view, social practices and public discourse serve as proxies for speech
that further the value of democratic legitimation. Social practices are
protected precisely because the content of speech within them is
generally thought normatively necessary for influencing public opinion.
Collectively, those social practices define the boundaries of public
discourse. Speech acts occurring within public discourse presumptively
further the value of democratic legitimation and are therefore entitled to
First Amendment protection.77 Whether particular social practices
contain such speech would be open to reevaluation over time.78 This
approach would allow public discourse to carry weight in the analysis,
but would tie its relevance to the value of democratic legitimation.
Naturally, the proxy approach has complications of its own. Eugene
Volokh raises one such complication when he argues that “defining the

76. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 675.
77. I take Post to be arguing something similar when he says that each instance of speech in a
protected medium should “presumptively” be protected “absen[t] . . . strong countervailing
reasons.” POST, supra note 1, at 20. But his point seems to be an argument about the conditions
under which speech in public discourse can be regulated (a question of protection) rather than, as I
argue here, the conditions under which speech is recognized as being part of public discourse in the
first place (a question of coverage).
78. Such an approach would have much in common with the “institutional” approach to the First
Amendment, which is premised on the idea that theory and doctrine should take note of the
mediating institutions such as schools and the press that create and regulate speech. See PAUL
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming Harvard University Press 2012)
(describing the institutional approach); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) (same); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821 (2008) (same). Post himself seems to disclaim the
relationship, however, saying that the “premise of the institutional approach” is “implausible.”
POST, supra note 1, at 51.
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medium by what is shown in it . . . eliminat[es] the utility of medium as
a proxy for the public discourse status of ‘each instance’ of the
medium.”79 The thrust of this criticism is accurate, but not its
conclusion. Defining protected forms of communication based on
whether they contain protected content does raise the possibility that the
value of the proxy will collapse. But that does not eliminate the proxy’s
utility. If newspapers are considered protected media because they
generally contain material that is thought normatively necessary to the
formation of public opinion, the medium has been defined and protected
based on what is shown in it. Nonetheless, in future cases, each instance
of the medium could be presumptively protected without referring back
to that content. That is the basic mechanism of all rules and categories,80
and indeed is the heart of the “definitional balancing” approach to the
First Amendment.81
Moreover, the medium-as-proxy approach could display varying
degrees of rigidity. If implemented in strict, rule-like fashion, it would
mean strictly “presum[ing]”82 First Amendment coverage for speech acts
within certain contexts or media. Those contexts and media could
themselves be established by direct reference to whether speech within
them is generally thought “normatively necessary” to the formation of
public opinion.83 But in any individual case, courts would not ask
whether the particular speech act at issue furthered that value.84 If
implemented in a more standard-like fashion, the medium-as-proxy
approach would simply create a rebuttable presumption that a speech act
in a protected medium has content that furthers the value of democratic
legitimation. The strength of that presumption could vary depending on
the medium.
Of course, all proxies are both under- and over-broad. Basing First

79. Volokh, “Public Discourse,” supra note 53, at 584.
80. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992); see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism
and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009).
81. See generally Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1184–85 (1970) (describing definitional
balancing approach).
82. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 483.
83. POST, supra note 1, at 18.
84. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if
confined to expressions conveying a particularized message, would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Amendment protection on context and social practices rather than
individual speech acts would sometimes mean denying First Amendment
coverage to speech acts occurring outside of traditionally recognized
media of public discourse, even if their content would contribute to the
formation of public opinion. It would also mean protecting speech acts
based solely on the fact that they occur within a medium that frequently
includes messages that do further constitutional values. The proxy would
be an imperfect but implementable placeholder for constitutionally
valuable speech. That principled but pragmatic approach seems
consistent with the “fundamental aspiration” of Post’s work, which he
has described as providing “an account of First Amendment doctrine that
gives ‘considerable weight to ease of explanation and comprehension,
feasibility of implementation in an imperfect institutional
environment.’”85 That leads inevitably to “a certain degree of pragmatic
simplification.”86 It also demands a kind of “reflective equilibrium” in
which constitutional ideals and history are measured against one
another.87 And perhaps the best way to illustrate that and the other issues
raised here is by considering the First Amendment’s treatment of the
press, which as Post has argued is deeply bound up with the concept and
practice of public discourse.
B.

Democratic Legitimation and the Press

The relationships between democratic legitimation, public discourse,
and protected social practices are important in Post’s theory not simply
for taxonomic purposes, but because constitutional coverage depends on
their presence. The previous Part highlighted some conceptual
difficulties with that relationship. This Part attempts, as Post urges, to
evaluate it in light of “our historical commitments and principles.”88
85. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 617 (citing Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the
Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 531 (2011)).
86. Id.
87. POST, supra note 1, at 5 (“We can . . . aspire to what John Rawls has termed ‘considered
judgment in reflective equilibrium.’” (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46–49 (1971)));
Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 477 (“Determining the meaning of this
commitment [to protect freedom of speech] involves reflective equilibrium; it requires us to
interpret our history in light of our best ideals while simultaneously reexamining our ideals in light
of our actual history.”).
88. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 618 (“Because law typically acquires authority from the
commitments and principles of those whom it seeks to govern, I have sought to identify this
fundamental purpose by inquiring into our historical commitments and principles.” (citing Robert C.
Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative
Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007))).
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Specifically, it asks how his theory can account for constitutional
coverage of the press.
Post accords constitutional protection to the press first and most
prominently based on the democratic legitimation grounds sketched out
above.89 The press, on this account, has a “unique” claim to First
Amendment coverage because it—or rather the media through which it
acts—helps form the public sphere.90 Indeed, Post argues that the public
sphere took shape as a result of “the development of affordable and
widely dispersed printed material, like books and newspapers,” which
permitted strangers to “communicate systematically and regularly with
each other.”91 It follows that “[m]edia like newspapers are major
components of this structure and indeed are the historical grounds for its
emergence. This is why First Amendment doctrine typically regards
communication within recognized media as presumptively within public
discourse and hence within the scope of the First Amendment.”92 Indeed,
the U.S. Supreme Court has often referred to the importance of the
press—a term which, significantly, is used interchangeably with “the
media”—in creating and maintaining public discourse or, as the Court
explained in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,93 “providing a
forum for discussion and debate.”94
Straightforward as it seems, however, this explanation raises a few
potential complications. First is the context–content issue described in
Part I.A. Post argued more than twenty years ago that “media speech,
simply by virtue of the manner of its distribution, presents a strong prima
facie claim to be classified as public discourse.”95 This is of course a
claim based on context rather than content, and therefore raises the
circularity problems discussed above. Those problems are exacerbated
with regard to the press, given its central role in creating the public

89. Part II of this Essay considers whether the value of democratic competence might also be
applicable.
90. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678 (“Media speech is thus unique because it carries
within it this prima facie claim to constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely on the manner
of its distribution rather than its content.”).
91. POST, supra note 1, at 18; see also id. at 20 (“First Amendment coverage presumptively
extends to media for the communication of ideas, like newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or
cinema, which are the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts that define and sustain the
public sphere. In the absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such media is
covered by the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)).
92. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486.
93. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
94. Id. at 781.
95. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 677–78 (emphasis added).
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sphere. If media like newspapers effectively created public discourse, as
Post argues, it seems unsatisfying to protect them simply on the basis
that they are part of it. It may well be true that “[t]he emergence of the
mass media and of the ‘public’ are mutually constructive
developments.”96 However, that does not mean that the constitutional
value of each can be rooted in the other.
Second, as a matter of existing doctrine, it is simply not the case that
all communications occurring in traditional media are given complete
protection. A newspaper that prints libelous statements about private
figures cannot claim constitutional immunity to tort,97 even though
newspapers are “the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts that
define and sustain the public sphere.”98 Similarly, advertisements may be
treated like commercial speech—and thus receive less-than-full First
Amendment protection99—even when they appear in newspapers or
magazines. Moreover, copyright laws are constitutional notwithstanding
the fact that copyright-infringing speech often occurs within the
traditional media that constitute public discourse.100
These examples of unprotected speech in what would appear to be
public discourse present some difficulties for Post’s theory, because its
stated aim is to reflect doctrine as well as to shape it.101 As he notes,
“[t]o determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must
consult the actual shape of entrenched First Amendment
jurisprudence.”102 If entrenched First Amendment jurisprudence does not
actually extend protection to “each instance of the [protected]
medium”103 of newspapers or other media through which the press
96. Id. at 635 (quoting ALVIN GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY: THE
ORIGINS, GRAMMAR, AND FUTURE OF IDEOLOGY 106 (1976)).
97. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (permitting private individuals to
pursue defamation claims so long as negligence is proven).
98. POST, supra note 1, at 20.
99. Id. at 41–44. Post himself clarifies that commercial speech serves the value of democratic
competence rather than democratic legitimation. Id. at 43.
100. Volokh, “Public Discourse,” supra note 53, at 567–71; see also id. at 582 (“Securities law
regulates, among other things, the contents of advertisements published in newspapers and
magazines, as well as self-published pamphlets. Yet much obvious ‘public discourse’ is likewise
published in newspapers, magazines, advertisements in those newspapers and magazines . . . and
self-published pamphlets.”).
101. POST, supra note 1, at 4; see also Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 617–18.
102. POST, supra note 1, at 5; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech
Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 549, 549 (2011) (reading Post’s theory as attempting to “provide the
theoretical foundations to understand our existing practices, cases, and our historical traditions and
thereby offer explanatory and justificatory cohesion for them”).
103. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1253.
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traditionally communicates, it seems wrong to treat the press as a social
practice constitutive of public discourse (which is, by definition,
presumptively protected).
This problem is not unfamiliar to Post, however, and he has many
potential responses to it. He has previously recognized that the media’s
claim to First Amendment protection “is defeasible; obscene speech, for
example, can be distributed through the mass media. But the existence
and strength of the claim [of constitutional protection] makes the
exclusion of media speech from public discourse difficult and
controversial.”104 Perhaps these categories of speech are unprotected,
even when conducted through mass media, precisely because they
present the kinds of “strong countervailing reasons” sufficient to
overcome the presumption of protection that attaches to the traditional
mechanisms of public discourse.105 That explanation itself raises a host
of difficult questions about what counts as a countervailing reason—
Lack of contribution to public discourse? Inequality of parties?—but it
does help make sense of existing doctrine. Post might also say that the
First Amendment’s treatment of some uncovered press activities—
defamation and obscenity, for example—represents an effort to mediate
community values with those of public discourse.106 But that response
also raises further complications. Among other things, it means allowing
traditional social biases to define the boundaries of public discourse,107
which as Post recognizes is itself a form of speech regulation.108
A third potential problem with treating the press as constitutive of
public discourse is that despite the seemingly strong support for press
protection that Post’s theory and other sources provide, First
Amendment doctrine does not reflect special solicitude for the press.
The text of the First Amendment singles out the “press” for
protection,109 of course, and the press has historically played a crucial

104. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678.
105. POST, supra note 1, at 20.
106. See generally Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2; Robert Post, Community and the First
Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473 (1997) [hereinafter Post, Community].
107. Redish & Mollen, supra note 51, at 1350 (“The theoretical inconsistency of this result is
notable: after consistently undervaluing and underprotecting speech by ignoring its possible value to
the audience, Post gives the audience’s perceived social norms a central role in justifying
suppression of speech by allowing community norms to define the boundaries of the public
discourse.”).
108. See sources cited supra note 51.
109. Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2011) (“Writing
off the Press Clause as nothing more than the framers’ gentle reminder that we all have a right to
publish our speech is problematic on several levels.”).
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role in creating and maintaining the public sphere.110 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he Constitution specifically selected the
press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but
also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the
discussion of public affairs.”111 If, as Post argues, such activities and
forms of communication actually created the public sphere,112 shouldn’t
they be accorded heightened constitutional protection? At the very least,
it would seem that First Amendment doctrine should extend protection
to core press activities like claims of privilege and access to
information.113
Yet First Amendment doctrine does not necessarily cover these
activities, and indeed gives few legal protections to the press as such.114
Branzburg v. Hayes115 is exemplary. In that case, the Court recognized
that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”116
a careful phrase that might suggest, but does not actually deliver, a
special set of constitutional protections for the press. Specifically, the
Court declined to give journalists a First Amendment right to withhold
information about confidential sources from a grand jury investigating
criminal behavior.117 Similarly, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,118 the Court ringingly endorsed the notion that “without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated.”119 But even as it recognized a general constitutional right
of public access to certain kinds of judicial proceedings, the Court did
not give the press any greater share of that right than the public at
large.120
110. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
111. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (citations omitted).
112. POST, supra note 1, at 18; see also id. at 20.
113. See Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response to
Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 534 (2011) (“A First Amendment that valued participation
in public discourse above all else would, I should think, recognize an access right of the sort
proposed by Jerome Barron and roundly rejected by the Court.”).
114. West, supra note 109, at 1028 (“The Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the
value of the free press, but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or protection as
emanating solely from the Press Clause.”).
115. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
116. Id. at 707.
117. Id. at 690–91.
118. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 576 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).
120. Id. at 577 n.12 (“[M]edia . . . representatives are entitled to the same [right of access to
criminal trials] as the general public.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that
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The result of this, doctrinally, is that the press as such receives no
constitutional protection, but receives First Amendment coverage for the
same reasons and to the same degree as other speakers in public
discourse. As Post explains:
Media speech is . . . unique because it carries within it this prima
facie claim to constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely
on the manner of its distribution rather than on its content. This
singularity explains the Court’s continual attraction to a
distinction between media and nonmedia defendants. But on
close inspection the uniqueness of media speech lies only in the
particular way in which it grounds its claim to be public
discourse, a claim whose substance it shares with many other
kinds of communication.121
This explanation is descriptively accurate, and yet somewhat
unsatisfying. Even if other forms of speech employ similar manners of
distribution, the very fact that media speech is, by Post’s reckoning,
“unique,” suggests that it should be treated differently. Perhaps Post
would say that his book is focused on the limits of First Amendment
coverage rather than the degree of protection it bestows,122 and thus that
the question of whether the press should receive heightened protection is
simply beyond his scope. But that, too, is unsatisfying, because First
Amendment doctrine includes widely varying tests for different kinds of
covered speech.123 Given that Post’s stated aim is to account for the
shape of current doctrine,124 the issue of differential coverage would
seem to fall squarely within his reach.
A fourth and related difficulty with First Amendment treatment of the
press is not specific to Post’s theory, but may highlight another
complication with it. That is the intractable problem of determining who
or what counts as the press—a task whose difficulty might explain why
the press is not given special treatment in current First Amendment
doctrine.125 It is made all the more acute by the changing nature, role,
the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he rights of the institutional media are no
greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same
activities.”).
121. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678.
122. See POST, supra note 1, at 1, 96.
123. See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 31 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1982) (exploring differences between coverage and protection).
124. See sources cited supra note 36.
125. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[A]
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and mechanisms of the press. Chief among these, perhaps, is the easy
accessibility of publication, for example on the Internet. If we are all
journalists now,126 maybe there is no point in creating special protection
for the press. In fact, extending First Amendment protection to particular
forms of communication traditionally employed by the institutional press
could exacerbate problems of over- and under-breadth. The
characteristic media associated with the press—newspapers and
magazines, among others127—often convey information that is not in any
real sense a matter of public discourse. Commercial advertisements, for
example, appear in traditional media and yet do not serve the value of
democratic legitimation.128 Conversely, a focus on traditional media
would fail to capture many modern means of maintaining the public
sphere. In the recent democratic revolutions across the Middle East, for
example, social media such as Twitter—“traditional” only in the loosest
sense of the term—effectively functioned as the press.129
These definitional difficulties are not unique to the press, of course.
Many organizations doing business under the name “university” are
devoted to the pursuit of some particular political or social end other
than the creation of knowledge. Post concludes that “[f]rom a
constitutional point of view, . . . academic freedom has nothing to do
with the autonomy of institutions that happen to include the name
‘university’ in their titles.”130 Rather, it covers only “institutions that
facilitate the application and improvement of professional scholarly
standards to advance knowledge for the public good.”131 Perhaps

fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status on a limited
group is one of definition.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972). But see Floyd
Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979) (“In the great preponderance of cases, a court has little difficulty
knowing a journalist when it sees one.”).
126. See generally SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF
THE PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007); DAN GILLMOR, WE THE
MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006).
127. See POST, supra note 1, at 20 (listing these as among the media traditionally constituting
public discourse).
128. Id. at 42.
129. See generally, e.g., TWEETS FROM TAHRIR: EGYPT’S REVOLUTION AS IT UNFOLDED, IN THE
WORDS OF THE PEOPLE WHO MADE IT (Alex Nunns & Nadia Idle, eds. 2011).
130. POST, supra note 1, at 78; see also id. at 90 (“True universities that protect academic
freedom, and that are accordingly entitled to claim the protection of academic freedom,
are . . . dedicated to the disciplinary diffusion of knowledge and to the disciplinary discovery of new
knowledge. It is only in such circumstances that universities serve the constitutional value of
democratic competence.”).
131. Id. at 78.
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“journalists” are only entitled to First Amendment protection when and
to the degree they respect the norms and rules of the discipline.132 But
defining protected media based on their disciplinarity is an answer
grounded in the value of democratic competence, not democratic
legitimation. Indeed, the very idea of disciplinarity is antithetical to the
notion of democratic legitimation. The following Part explores this
interaction.
II.

EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND THE PRESS

Though democratic legitimation is the cardinal value in Post’s theory
of free speech,133 his book’s cardinal contribution may be its exploration
of a different and in some sense contradictory value: democratic
competence. This value, he says, “refers to the cognitive empowerment
of persons within public discourse, which in part depends on their access
to disciplinary knowledge.”134 Indeed, what sets his work apart from any
other thoroughly elaborated First Amendment theory is the serious
attention it pays to the production of expert knowledge through means
that are hard to reconcile with familiar First Amendment principles. Yet
Post does not focus as much attention on related and important questions
such as how expert knowledge is disseminated into public discourse,
how it is or should be treated once it arrives there, whether knowledge
dissemination itself requires disciplinarity, and what institutions and
social practices besides universities are engaged in disseminating expert
knowledge. Part II.A addresses some of these questions. Part II.B
suggests that perhaps the press, as a disseminator and occasional
producer of expert knowledge, should be entitled to constitutional
protection under the principle of democratic competence.
A.

Expert Knowledge in Public Discourse

As Post notes, intelligent self-governance requires expert
knowledge.135 It follows that “[r]eliable expert knowledge is necessary
132. Cf. Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for
the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979) (“[A]ll citizens exercising the press
function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed by the ‘institutional press,’
warrant . . . protection.” (emphasis in original)).
133. POST, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]he value of democratic legitimation trumps that of democratic
competence.”).
134. Id. at 33–34.
135. Id. at 32 (“Expert knowledge is prerequisite for intelligent self-governance.”); see also id. at
34 (“Cognitive empowerment is necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of
democratic legitimation.”); id. at ix (“Any modern society needs expert knowledge in order to
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not only for intelligent self-governance, but also for the very value of
democratic legitimation.”136 This simple fact raises a significant problem
for the First Amendment. Expert knowledge “can be produced only if
the norms and practices of a discipline are observed,”137 and “[t]he
continuous discipline of peer judgment, which virtually defines expert
knowledge, is quite incompatible with deep and fundamental First
Amendment doctrines” such as those governing viewpoint and content
neutrality.138 Thus “[i]f expert knowledge depends upon the preservation
of disciplines, and if disciplines require maintenance of ‘proper and
orderly action,’ the very independence jealously safeguarded by the First
Amendment is in tension with the production of expert knowledge.”139
Post concludes that “[b]y maintaining a continuous tension between state
authority to regulate expert knowledge practices on the one hand, and
the relative constitutional autonomy of such knowledge practices on the
other, we recognize and honor the need to negotiate between these two
important social needs.”140
But negotiating between those two social needs, as opposed to simply
embracing their incompatibility, requires accounting for how expert
knowledge is disseminated into public discourse and how it is or should
be treated once it arrives. These are essential questions, for the very
value of democratic competence depends on the role of expert
knowledge in public discourse. As Post argues, “[d]emocratic
competence refers to the cognitive empowerment of persons within
public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary
knowledge.”141 The U.S. Supreme Court has similarly explained that it
interprets the First Amendment with the goal of “securing , , , an
informed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is
of public concern.”142
Post devotes the second chapter of the book to the question of
“whether we can discern distinct First Amendment doctrines designed to

survive and prosper.”); id. at 35 (“[A]n educated and informed public opinion will more
intelligently and effectively supervise the government.”).
136. Id. at 32–33.
137. Id. at xi.
138. Id. at 9; see also id. at 31 (“The creation of reliable disciplinary knowledge must accordingly
be relegated to institutions that are not controlled by the constitutional value of democratic
legitimation.”).
139. Id. at xiii.
140. Id. at 98–99.
141. Id. at 33–34 (emphasis added).
142. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
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protect the social practices that produce and distribute disciplinary
knowledge.”143 In answering that question, he focuses primarily on
commercial speech doctrine, “which vigorously protects the
dissemination of factual information outside of public discourse.”144
That doctrine is also “antithetical to First Amendment protections for
public discourse,”145 because, among other things, it permits speech to
be limited on the basis of its truthfulness. Post concludes that
“[c]onstitutional protections for the dissemination of expert knowledge
should . . . be roughly analogous to those applicable to the circulation of
commercial information.”146 And “[i]f we wish to make visible our
existing constitutional instincts in this area, we must scrutinize domains
outside of public discourse.”147
The harder question, however, is how the First Amendment should
treat the dissemination of expert knowledge into or within public
discourse. One answer might be that the dissemination of expert
knowledge into public discourse is itself a form of public discourse. But
Post does not seem to believe this. He writes that “classrooms are a
primary medium for the transmission of scholarly expertise to the
public,”148 and yet “[t]he classroom is not a location in which the value
of democratic legitimation is at stake.”149 This only makes sense if
media through which expertise is transmitted to the public are not
necessarily part of public discourse.
Moreover, at a conceptual level, there are good reasons to think that,
under Post’s theory, the dissemination of expert knowledge should not
itself be treated as a form of public discourse—at least not automatically.
We do not value expert knowledge, or its dissemination, on the basis of
143. POST, supra note 1, at 33.
144. Id. at 34–35.
145. Id. at 43.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added). It is possible, of course, that modern doctrine is simply wrong to treat
commercial speech as being outside of public discourse. Indeed, by Post’s own description,
“commercial speech tends to be addressed to the general public in advertisements that are placed in
newspapers or radio or other media that are widely distributed.” Id. at 46. But this is an argument
Post has addressed elsewhere and at length, and I will not revisit it here. See Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) (concluding that
commercial speech falls outside of public discourse because it “should be understood as an
effort . . . simply to sell products” and not “to engage public opinion”); see also Redish & Mollen,
supra note 51, at 1346 (criticizing this argument).
148. POST, supra note 1, at 88.
149. Id. at 70; see also id. at 83 (“In these lectures Sweezy did not play the role of a citizen; he
was not participating in public discourse. He was an expert communicating knowledge to his
students and thereby to the public.” (citation omitted)).
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experts’ interest in experiencing authorship of the laws that bind them,
as an emphasis on public discourse would suggest.150 Rather, we value
the dissemination of expert knowledge precisely to the degree that it
informs listeners. And that is a value that public discourse and the
principle of democratic legitimation struggle to capture.
Perhaps instead dissemination of expert knowledge counts, at least
presumptively, as public discourse when it occurs through the social
practices traditionally recognized as constituting public discourse:
newspapers, magazines, and the like. As Post explains:
[C]ommunication of expert knowledge within public discourse
is typically protected by the value of democratic legitimation,
which can obscure the distinct protections inspired by
democratic competence. If an expert chooses to participate in
public discourse by speaking about matters within her expertise,
her speech will characteristically be classified as fully protected
opinion.151
But that simply highlights the problem, for public discourse does not
recognize truth,152 let alone expert knowledge. All people can claim
expertise in public discourse, whether or not the “knowledge” they
transmit is a product of disciplinarity.153 As Post’s account reveals, their
speech “will characteristically be classified as fully protected
opinion.”154 That is fine so far as it goes, but absent some endorsement
of a marketplace-of-ideas rationale, it is hard to see how transmuting
knowledge to opinion aids the dissemination of knowledge.
The difficult question, therefore, is how expert knowledge can retain
its character in public discourse. It is not enough to “maintain[]
separation between the ‘sphere of knowledge’ and the ‘sphere of
power,’”155 for the value of democratic competence lies precisely in the
fact that (expert) knowledge informs (governing) power. One possibility,
of course, would be for law to take an active role in separating fact from
opinion and protecting claims of expert knowledge, even in public
150. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
151. POST, supra note 1, at 43; see also Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 passim (exploring
the distinction between a dentist who publicly argues against the use of amalgams, thereby engaging
in public discourse, from the dentist who privately counsels her patients to avoid them, thereby
speaking outside of public discourse and subject to sanction).
152. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
153. POST, supra note 1, at 44 (“Members of the general public can rely on expert
pronouncements within public discourse only at their peril.”).
154. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 59.

07 -- Blocher FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/23/2012 8:20 AM

434

[Vol. 87:409

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

discourse. After all, “the value of democratic competence can be
judicially protected only if courts incorporate and apply the disciplinary
methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”156 Having done that,
and thereby effectively given a legal advantage to disciplinary
knowledge—an advantage which must matter, else Post would not
advocate it—why not simply continue to do so even as the knowledge
moves in public discourse?
The fact that Post rejects this option reflects his belief that democratic
legitimation trumps democratic competence, at least in public discourse.
Within public discourse, he says, the state may not “enforce the
disciplinary methods that make expert knowledge reliable.”157 When the
press operates within public discourse, for example, any checks on its
speech must be extra-legal: “Biologists can with impunity write
editorials in the New York Times that are such poor science that they
would constitute grounds for denying tenure within a
university. . . . Such pronouncements are ultimately subject to political
rather than legal accountability.”158 This is in keeping with the basic
theory and value of democratic legitimation.
But in order for democratic competence to succeed on its own terms,
there must be some method of accountability, legal or otherwise, for
claims of expertise in public discourse. Without more—that is, without
an account of why and how people in public discourse will be able to
separate truth and expert knowledge from falsehood and chicanery—the
basic premise that expert knowledge will inform participatory
democracy will fail. A First Amendment theory predicated on the value
of expert knowledge in public discourse must have some way to account
for how that truthful expertise will be transmitted.
One answer would be to posit a hard line between expert knowledge
and public discourse, such that the two co-exist but never interact.
Perhaps individuals accumulate expert knowledge outside of public
discourse and then enter into public discourse, where their previous
accumulation of knowledge improves their ability to engage. On this
account, expert knowledge would never really be a part of public
discourse, but a part of preparation to engage in such discourse. Post
seems to have this in mind when he explores commercial speech
doctrine, which concerns “the circulation of information outside of
public discourse,”159 but is worthy of First Amendment coverage
156. Id. at 54.
157. Id. at 44.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
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because it “prevents the state from obliterating independent sources of
expert knowledge”160 while “empower[ing] democratic citizens to
demand accountability from their government.”161
This is a very attractive explanation. Equipping people to understand
and evaluate concepts in public discourse is obviously important, and
surely there is First Amendment value in encouraging individual
cognitive development outside of public discourse. But it seems hard to
maintain the division between expert knowledge “in” public discourse
and expert knowledge “before” public discourse. If the point of
knowledge is to inform public discourse, at some point it must enter into
it. Post says, for example, that the restriction on attorney–client
communications that the U.S. Supreme Court considered in Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States162 can be understood to trigger
First Amendment coverage because “its purpose and effect was to block
the communication of knowledge that might ultimately inform public
opinion and thereby enhance the competency of democratic decisionmaking” even though “this knowledge is communicated outside public
discourse.”163
This leads to a second and related potential answer to the question of
how expert knowledge can prove valuable in public discourse: Such
knowledge will be recognized for what it is, and will gain acceptance
over less worthy claims. This is, of course, a version of the marketplaceof-ideas metaphor, which suggests that free speech is valuable precisely
because truth will ultimately win out in competition with falsehood.164
Though participatory democracy is Post’s primary First Amendment
principle, he also believes that the marketplace metaphor captures

160. Id.
161. Id. at 60.
162. 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). The relevant language provided:
A debt relief agency shall not (4) advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to
incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to pay an
attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for services performed as part of
preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this title.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C § 526 (a)(4) (2006).
163. POST, supra note 1, at 52–53; see also id. at 61 (“The value of democratic competence is
undermined whenever the state acts to interrupt the communication of disciplinary knowledge that
might inform the creation of public opinion.”).
164. See also Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (“[N]early all speech restrictions
that interfere with the search for truth also interfere with the right to ‘participate in the formation of
public opinion.’”); cf. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING 45 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644) (“Let [truth] and falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”).
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something important about the value of free speech. He notes at the
outset of the book, “I focus on the marketplace of ideas from a slightly
different angle. I inquire into the relationship between the marketplace
of ideas and the production of expert knowledge.”165
But this interpretation relies on a potentially problematic view of the
marketplace of ideas and how individuals within it respond to claims of
expertise. Post believes that “[w]e rely on expert ‘knowledge’ precisely
because it has been vetted and reviewed by those whose judgment we
have reason to trust.”166 Thus, for example, “[w]e regard scientific
beliefs as reliable because they are subject to disciplinary standards of
verifiability, reproducibility, falsifiability, and so on.”167 Post goes on to
endorse Allen Buchanan’s argument for the necessity of “the social
identification of experts, that is, epistemic authorities, individuals or
groups to whom others defer as reliable sources of true beliefs.”168
This effort to join democratic competence and public discourse is
extremely appealing, but raises conceptual and practical problems. At a
conceptual level, the same “unrestrained epistemic egalitarianism” that
is “incompatible with the division of epistemic labor necessary for the
production of expert knowledge”169 also seems incompatible with the
identification of those authorities who are doing the producing. In other
words, if public discourse does not permit recognizing expert
knowledge, then it is hard to see how it permits recognizing the
authorities, institutions, and practices responsible for creating such
knowledge.
Moreover, as a practical matter, there is some reason to doubt that
people actually do recognize or value claims of expert knowledge in
public discourse. As Suzanna Sherry has pointed out, “we have created a
society that finds experts unnecessary and even faintly suspect. . . . More
people believe in angels than in evolution, and belief in evolution only
narrowly surpasses belief in UFOs. Elected officials and candidates
publicly deny the validity of facts on which there is scientific
consensus.”170 At the very least, this raises serious empirical questions

165. POST, supra note 1, at xi (emphasis added). Again, it is worth noting that Post’s emphasis is
on the production of knowledge, not its dissemination.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Id. at 29.
168. Id. at 32 (citing Allen Buchanan, Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology, 32 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 95, 103 (2004)).
169. Id. at 32 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of Expertise, 125
HARV. L. REV. FORUM 7, 10 (2011).
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about whether and to what degree expert knowledge actually does
inform democratic decision-making. If it does not, Post’s faith in the
marketplace as a mechanism for joining democratic competence and
democratic legitimation is misplaced. The apparent distrust of expert
knowledge—surely an important issue for Post’s theory—may in fact be
a result of the failure to recognize disciplinarity. As Sherry puts it, “the
main culprit in encouraging resistance to expert knowledge . . . is the
democratization of the creation and authoritativeness of knowledge.”171
Rehabilitating faith in expert knowledge may be both an essential goal
of Post’s theory and a prerequisite for its success.
Another way to mediate the interface between democratic
legitimation and democratic competence might be through focusing
more specifically on the mechanisms by which expert knowledge is
disseminated. If such knowledge can only be created through
disciplinarity, perhaps its proper dissemination also requires
disciplinarity, at least insofar as the principle of democratic competence
is concerned.172 Indeed, disciplinarity with regard to the transmission of
expert knowledge might be particularly important, because the recipients
of that knowledge are likely to be less informed than the experts
disseminating it, thus eliminating the egalitarian presumption that
applies in public discourse.173 But disseminating expert knowledge
implicates different norms and forms of disciplinarity than the
production of knowledge. Failed academic enterprises, for example,
might not directly contribute to the production of expert knowledge, but
they can nonetheless be relevant to its accurate transmission. If a lab has
tried ten times to achieve a desired result (desired, perhaps, because it
would satisfy a major funder), succeeds on the tenth occasion, and then
publishes a paper reporting only the successful result, it has produced
expert knowledge. But it has arguably failed to transmit other relevant
knowledge—the identity of the funder, the amount of funding, the
failure of the previous nine tests, and so on.
The disciplinarity of knowledge-creation within such scholarly
settings has been an interest of Post’s for many years,174 and is the
171. Id. at 10; see also id. at 11 (“Segments of the American public seem to have
domesticated . . . postmodern skepticism by combining it with democratic anti-elitism, ultimately
trusting only knowledge that is created by democratic means.”).
172. Cf. POST, supra note 1, at 90 (referring to the “disciplinary diffusion of knowledge”).
173. See generally Post, Community, supra note 106; Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24 (2006).
174. See, e.g., M ATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009) (describing the historical development and
contemporary principles of Amendment academic freedom).
OF
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primary focus of his discussion of democratic competence. He argues
that “[u]niversities and university faculty are the unique and primary
sites in American society for the creation and diffusion of disciplinary
knowledge in the service of the public good.”175 The former role—
creation of knowledge—seems true enough. But are universities really
the primary sites through which such knowledge is “diffuse[d]” into
public discourse? Certainly some dissemination of expert knowledge
happens through teaching. As noted above, however, Post believes that
“[t]he classroom is not a location in which the value of democratic
legitimation is at stake.”176 It follows that teaching in university
classrooms is not a form of public discourse. But if it is not, when does
the knowledge transmitted through teaching enter into public discourse?
If students debate the day’s lecture while walking back to their
dormitory, surely they are engaged in public discourse.177 What if they
go to the professor’s office to discuss it further, set up an off-campus
lunch meeting with her, or relay the lecture’s contents to other students
not in the class?
Post generally holds aside the role of teaching in the distribution of
expert knowledge,178 focusing instead on research and publication.179
But there must be social practices other than scholarly research and
publication that create and distribute disciplinary knowledge into public
discourse.180 The following Part considers whether the press is one.
B.

Democratic Competence and the Press

Part I.B argued among other things that the value of democratic
legitimation provides strong but imperfect support for First Amendment
protection of the press: strong, because it would give constitutional
protection to the press on the basis that it virtually constitutes public
175. POST, supra note 1, at 68; see also id. at 63 (referring to the modern university’s role in the
“dissemination” of knowledge (citations omitted)).
176. Id. at 70; see also id. at 69 (“These lectures formed no part of public discourse, because
Sweezy’s relationship to the students in his classroom constituted a professional relationship,
analogous to the relationship between a lawyer and her clients.”).
177. But see Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 623 (calling it a “close case” whether “family
conversations about presidential politics should be protected as public discourse”).
178. POST, supra note 1, at 70, 77 n.56, 88.
179. Id. at 88 (arguing that “research and publication . . . includes the right to disseminate the
results of research to the public, including and most especially to students in the classroom”); see
also id. (“Academic freedom of research and publication must include, at a minimum, the freedom
to communicate the results of research to students when it is pedagogically relevant to do so.”).
180. Id. at 96 (“The practices of astrology and palmistry would not qualify, but those of
chemistry, law, and medicine probably would.”).
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discourse; imperfect, because it cannot fully explain many prominent
features of First Amendment doctrine. Nor, for that matter, does it fit
well with the usual arguments for constitutional protection of the press—
things like informational benefits to readers and the checking function of
the press, rather than journalists’ autonomy interests, as the democratic
legitimation approach would suggest.
Moreover, the democratic legitimation value, standing alone, cannot
account for the press’s own internal disciplinarity, including basic
editing standards. What of those activities that are not themselves part of
public discourse, but which are nonetheless necessary for effective
dissemination of information—newsgathering, for example? If
knowledge dissemination requires its own forms of disciplinarity—of
internal regulation, norms, and discipline—then presumably much of
what makes knowledge dissemination work occurs outside of public
discourse.
These questions suggest that democratic legitimation alone is not
enough to account for First Amendment protection of the press. There is
some reason to think that democratic competence can help fill the gap,
though Post himself does not argue as much. For one thing, the press
disseminates knowledge, including expert knowledge. As Justice Powell
recognized, “[n]o individual can obtain for himself the information
needed for intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. . . . [The
press] is the means by which the people receive that free flow of
information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government.”181 Much,
though of course not all, of the “information and ideas essential to
intelligent self-government” consists of expert knowledge relayed by
press pundits. Powell also argued that laws are constitutionally suspect
when they “restrain[] the ability of the press to perform its
constitutionally established function of informing the people on the
conduct of their government.”182 Powell happened to be writing in
dissent in both of those cases, but the ideas he expressed have long had
broad appeal. In Branzburg, for example, the Court concluded that “[t]he
function of the press is to explore and investigate events, inform the
people what is going on, and to expose the harmful as well as the good
influences at work.”183
In addition to reporting expert knowledge, the press can sometimes
produce it. Indeed, the very purpose and function of investigative
181. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
182. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
183. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1972).
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journalism is to report previously unknown facts.184 When Woodward
and Bernstein discovered, assembled, and synthesized the Watergate
story,185 or Andrew Ross Sorkin wrote Too Big to Fail,186 they were
surely producing knowledge akin to that created by a university-based
scholar. Perhaps one might argue that investigative journalism uncovers
knowledge, rather than creating it. But that seems too fine a distinction.
Scientists, too, are largely in the businesses of uncovering pre-existing
facts about the natural world,187 though no one doubts that by doing so
they are adding to the sum total of human knowledge.
Together, these roles—the dissemination and occasional creation of
expert knowledge—suggest that the press, like academia, should receive
First Amendment protection under the principle of democratic
competence. But of course there is another essential ingredient that the
press must possess in order to gain protection under the value of
democratic competence: disciplinarity. Although the press may not
exhibit the same forms of disciplinarity as academia, it does have its
own internal rules. Like academia, the press has adopted formalized
internal rules and mechanisms of control.188 Professional trade
organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
the Society of Professional Journalists,189 as well as by individual
newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters create and enforce such rules.
Among other things, these disciplinary rules require caution when
dealing with sources who request anonymity, and “advise journalists to
refuse to reveal confidential sources to any court or investigative
entity.”190 Journalists who fail to adhere to these or other rules of the
184. See Hugo de Burgh, Kings Without Crowns? The Re-Emergence of Investigative Journalism
in China, 25 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 801, 806 (2003) (defining investigative journalism as
“extensive research by one or more journalists to uncover matters which affect the citizenry of the
society in which the journalist lives and of which the society generally does not approve but is
unaware”).
185. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974).
186. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009).
187. Of course, they do so in ways that an individual’s untrained senses could not. This is why, to
take the example with which Post begins the book, we rely on experts to show us that cigarettes
cause cancer, but not to prove the existence of oak trees in our yards. POST, supra note 1, at ix. But
journalists, too, uncover facts that an individual’s untrained senses could not.
188. Patrick Garry collects and discusses these rules. See Patrick J. Garry, Assessing the
Constitutional Autonomy of Such Non-State Institutions as the Press and Academia, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 141, 152–53 (2010). My explanation here is drawn from his.
189. Id. at 152 (“In 1922, the American Society of Newspaper Editors introduced the first ethical
guidelines, called the ‘Canons of Journalism.’”).
190. Id. (citing American Newspaper Guild, Code of Ethics, Canon 5 (1934), reprinted in THE
NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY 567 (George L. Bird & Frederic E. Merwin eds., 1942)).
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discipline are regularly disciplined through social or employment-related
sanctions.191
Journalistic disciplinarity may well extend, albeit in different forms,
beyond the institutional press. As noted above, the boundaries of the
press have changed significantly, to the point that perhaps we are all
truly journalists now.192 But even the non-institutional press—citizen
journalists and the blogosphere, for example—has its own norms, many
of which are rigorously enforced. These norms include linking to other
sources, having open comments sections, admitting errors, and not
“hijacking” comments threads.193 Writers who fail to adhere to them are
sanctioned through mockery, shunning, and loss of readership and status,
which for many bloggers and citizen-journalists are the primary reasons
to write at all. These may not seem like concrete harms comparable to a
denial of tenure, but in a world where reputation and social capital are
driving forces, the incentive to adhere to social standards is significant.
Inasmuch as these disciplinary norms limit journalists’ autonomous
speech in the name of some other value, the press has much in common
with academia. A professor who fails to adhere to the standards of
research and publication in her field will be denied tenure
notwithstanding whatever autonomy interest she has in her research.
Similarly, journalists are not free to pursue their own individual interests
free from any institutional constraints. Their speech, in other words, is
not protected on the basis of their autonomy, but because it is produced
in accordance with the norms of their discipline. Post argues that
scholarship is worthy of First Amendment protection precisely when and
because it respects disciplinary norms.194 Journalism, on this account,
may be entitled to solicitude on the same basis.
Extending constitutional protection to the press based on the principle
of democratic legitimation would entail some major shifts in First
Amendment jurisprudence. As Post notes, “the value of democratic
competence can be judicially protected only if courts incorporate and
191. See, e.g., Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2003, at N1 (detailing wrongdoings of disgraced Times reporter Jayson Blair, who fabricated
stories); SHATTERED GLASS (Lions Gate Films 2003) (relating the story of journalist Stephen Glass,
who was fired for fabricating stories).
192. See GANT, supra note 126.
193. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, What Blogging Might Teach About Cybernorms, 4 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 239 (2010) (discussing the development and identification of norms in the
blogosphere).
194. POST, supra note 1, at 90 (arguing that only universities that are “dedicated to the
disciplinary diffusion of knowledge and to the disciplinary discovery of new knowledge” are
entitled to protection under the principle of democratic competence).
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apply the disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is
defined.”195 Courts would therefore need to incorporate and apply the
press’s disciplinary methods. That could mean giving constitutional
protection to such press methods as anonymous sourcing (a reporters’
privilege) and newsgathering (a right of access). But it would also mean
that the state could police journalists in much the same way as it polices
commercial or professional speech—to ensure that they are fulfilling the
functions that entitle them to protection in the first place. That would in
itself be a very high price to pay.196 Whether the argument from
democratic legitimation is a normatively attractive one for the press
therefore requires far more attention than this Essay has been able to
give it.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Essay has been to explore two ways in which the
tools Post employs seem to work awkwardly together. Part I attempts to
illustrate a few possible complications with the relationships between
public discourse, social practices, and the value of democratic
legitimation. If the first two concepts are disconnected from the third,
the justification for protecting public discourse and social practices
seems circular or unprincipled. But if they are fully dependent on the
value of democratic legitimation, they become no more than conclusory
labels for protected speech. Using public discourse as a continually
evolving proxy for speech that is “normatively necessary for influencing
public opinion”197 addresses both of these problems to some degree,
though admittedly raises a new set of complications.
Part II suggests that the relationship between public discourse and
expert knowledge—and therefore between democratic legitimation and
democratic competence—is even more problematic than Post has
recognized.198 He has not yet explored the mechanisms by which that
dissemination happens, whether dissemination requires its own forms of
disciplinarity, and how expert knowledge can retain its status as such
after it enters public discourse. It is to all of our advantage, however, that
the expert knowledge in his book has entered that discourse.
It would be impossible for any book, even one by Robert Post, to
fully explain both the characteristics of participatory democracy and the
195. Id. at 54.
196. I am very grateful to Robert Post for pointing this out to me.
197. POST, supra note 1, at 18.
198. Id. at xiii.
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methods by which expert knowledge is produced and disseminated.
Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom comes about as close as
any one book possibly could to achieving these crucially important
goals. In doing so, it has also illuminated the deep tension between them.
Mediating that tension, however, remains one of the central and
intractable challenges for First Amendment theory and doctrine.

